PrepShorts · Study sheet · Class 9 Mathematics · Chapter 7, The Mathematics of Maybe: Introduction to Probability
Chapter 7 · The Mathematics of Maybe: Introduction to Probability
Theoretical probability: counting favourable outcomes when all are equally likely
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Favourable over possible is not what probability means. It is a result that holds under one condition, and the condition carries all the content.
The idea
"Favourable divided by possible" is not what probability means; it is a result that holds under one condition, and the condition carries all the content. Counting only delivers a probability when the things being counted are equally likely, and the only thing that ever makes them equally likely is symmetry — a cube with identical faces, cards cut to one size, slips folded the same way. So the skill being taught is not the division; it is choosing what to count. The chapter's own Example 4 is the demonstration: the letter B in PROBABILITY has probability 2/11 because the eleven printed letter positions are equally likely, and 1/9 is what you get by counting the nine different letters, which are not.
What you should be able to do
- State the theoretical-probability formula and the assumption it requires
- Explain what "equally likely" demands, and give symmetry as the usual reason it holds
- Compute the theoretical probability of a named outcome for a die, a coin, a set of cards and a spinner
- Choose the sample space so that its elements are equally likely, and explain why the choice matters, using the letters of a word
- Decide, for a described experiment, whether its outcomes are equally likely, and justify the decision
- Distinguish an experiment whose outcomes are equally likely from one whose categories are not, using the marble bag
- Use the chapter's notation P(Event) and P(Outcome) correctly
- Compare the experimental and theoretical routes on what each assumes and what each needs
Words to know
| Term | Definition in one line | First introduced |
|---|---|---|
| theoretical probability | the count of outcomes that qualify, over the count of all of them, when all are equally likely | printed in bold as §7.2's second route (p. 159) and defined in §7.2.2 (p. 161) |
| equally likely | of outcomes with no reason to prefer any one | printed in bold in §7.2.2 (p. 161); §7.2's own gloss is that no outcome has any reason to be preferred (p. 159) |
| perfectly fair situation | the chapter's phrase for the idealisation theoretical probability describes | printed in bold in §7.2.2 (p. 161) |
| favourable outcomes | the outcomes that count as the event happening | printed in the formula in §7.2.2 (p. 161) |
| possible outcomes | every outcome the experiment can produce | printed in the formula in §7.2.2 (p. 161) |
| P(Event) | the chapter's notation for the probability of a named event | printed in §7.2.2 (p. 161), alongside P(Outcome) |
| symmetrical | shaped so that no side is favoured — the chapter's reason a coin is fair | printed in the FAIR AND UNBIASED box (p. 164) |
| standard die | a cube with the numbers 1 to 6, one on each face | printed in §7.2.2's Example 3 (p. 161) and in the event table (p. 158) |
| at random | in a way that gives no outcome an advantage | printed in §7.2.2's Example 4 (p. 161) and throughout the exercises |
| equally likely categories | groups of outcomes that happen to be the same size | an added phrasing, used only to name the trap in section 8; the chapter never labels it |
| granularity of the sample space | how finely the outcomes are split before you count them | an added term; the chapter makes the choice twice without naming it |
Where people slip up
- "Theoretical means true, experimental means approximate." Theoretical is exactly right about an idealisation. Whether the idealisation is the object in front of you is a separate question, and no amount of theory answers it.
- "Count the different things that can happen." PROBABILITY has nine different letters and eleven equally likely positions. Counting the wrong one gives 1/9 instead of 2/11.
- "Two possible results, so each has probability a half." The car either starts or does not. End-of-Chapter Q3 (i) is in the book to kill this.
- "Colours are outcomes." Where a bag holds 3 red marbles against 7 blue ones, the ten marbles are the equally likely outcomes; red and blue are groups of unequal size.
- "A baby is a boy or a girl, so 1/2 exactly." Nearly, and not exactly, and this chapter gives you no evidence either way. The honest answer names the assumption.
- "The formula is the definition of probability." It is a method that works under a stated condition. When the condition fails — the cup of Exercise Set 7.2 Q4 — the formula has nothing to say and the experimental route takes over.
- "P is something you multiply by." P(Event) is notation naming a number, the way sin θ names one. Nothing is being multiplied.
- "A spinner with eight coloured sectors is fair because the colours are different." It is fair, if it is, because the sectors are equal and the spin is unbiased. Colour is decoration.
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Worked answers to this chapter’s exercises · this video explains Exercise Set 7.2 Q5, End-of-Chapter Exercises Q3, End-of-Chapter Exercises Q4, End-of-Chapter Exercises Q5, End-of-Chapter Exercises Q9, End-of-Chapter Exercises Q12
Transcript1,446 words
Everyone learns the same formula for a chance: favourable outcomes over possible outcomes. Ask for a four on a die and it answers one in six, without your rolling anything. That is theoretical probability, and it is genuinely powerful. But look at where the six came from. It is a count of faces, and counting faces says nothing about chance. So the formula is not a definition. It is a result, true under one condition, and the whole of the mathematics is hiding inside that condition.
The condition is that the things being counted are equally likely. This video is about where that permission comes from, and about the harder question underneath: what you should be counting at all. Start with the die, and ask the awkward question. Why should any face be as likely as any other? The answer is not about probability but about shape. Pick a cube up and set it down again, any way you like.
There are exactly twenty-four ways to do it, each one a rearrangement of the six faces. Take any face and any other, and exactly four of those turns carry the first onto the second. Four, for every single one of the thirty-six pairs. No face is special: nothing you could say about one is not equally true of the rest. That is what interchangeable means, and it is what forces the six chances to be equal.
The denominator six is that argument, written down as a number. Now glue a small weight to one face, and watch the argument fall apart. Only the turns that leave the weight underneath still apply. Four survive out of twenty-four. And under those four the faces no longer mix. The weighted face stays put, the one opposite stays put, and the four around the side swap only among themselves. Three separate families where there was one.
The up face can no longer be carried onto the front face, so nothing makes them equal. Notice what did not change. There are still six faces, and six is still the right count. What was lost was the reason for dividing by it. One over six is a fact about a fair cube, not about the number six. So write the formula with its condition attached, and read the whole thing every time.
If, and only if, the outcomes are equally likely, the probability of an event is the number of favourable outcomes divided by the total. Favourable sounds like approval. It means only that the outcome counts as the event you asked about. Ask for a four on a fair die: one outcome qualifies out of six, so one sixth. As a decimal that is nought point one six seven, to three places.
As a percentage, sixteen point seven. And the six answers, one per face, add to exactly one: the check that you counted outcomes and not something else. Now the harder half, and it has nothing to do with fairness. It is about what you decide to count. Write out the word probability, and take one letter from it at random. The word runs to eleven letters. Nine are different, because two letters appear twice: the B and the I.
So what is the chance of drawing a B? Two reasonable answers come back, and both use the same formula. One says: there are two B positions among eleven positions, so two elevenths. The other says: there are nine different letters and B is one of them, so one ninth. Both divide favourable by possible. They cannot both be right. The formula does not settle it, because the formula was never the disagreement.
The disagreement is about what an outcome is. Test each collection against the condition. The eleven positions are a fair thing to count: no slot has anything the others lack. The nine different letters are not. Work out what each is worth: seven of the nine come out at one eleventh, and two at two elevenths. Two different weights in one collection. Dividing by nine treats them as though they were the same, and they are not.
So the answer is two elevenths, about eighteen point two per cent. One ninth is not bad arithmetic. It is correct arithmetic on the wrong collection. That example is one case of a rule worth carrying around. Take any set of equally likely outcomes and bundle them into groups. The groups are themselves equally likely exactly when every group holds the same number of outcomes. Three sweets, one of each flavour: groups of size one all round, so a third each, and here the objects and the categories coincide.
The letters of that long word: group sizes of one and two mixed together, so no. The odd and even faces of a die: three each, so yes, a half. Whenever a chance problem feels slippery, this is usually why: somebody has grouped the outcomes and then counted the groups. Here is a question that deserves a longer answer than it usually gets. A bag holds three purple marbles and seven blue ones, and you draw one without looking.
Ten marbles, the same size, reached for the same way. Equally likely, and the rule agrees: ten groups of one. So each individual marble is one tenth. But nobody asks about an individual marble. They ask about colour, and colour is a grouping: three in one group and seven in the other. Different sizes, so the two colours are not equally likely. Purple is three tenths and blue is seven tenths.
Those still add to one, and neither is a half. The marbles are equally likely; the colours are not; both sentences are about the same bag. Some questions have two outcomes and no symmetry at all. Turn a key in a car: it starts, or it does not. Two outcomes. Is it a half? Obviously not, and there is nothing in the car resembling the twenty-four turns of a cube.
The same trap catches a subtler case. A baby is born; the two possibilities are often treated as an even split. They are close to even but not exactly even, and nothing here could tell you the true figure. Say the outcomes are not equally likely, so the formula does not apply, and finding the number would take data rather than counting. Two outcomes never make a half on their own.
Symmetry does that, or evidence does, and if you have neither you have no number. When the condition genuinely holds, the counting is quick. An even number on a fair die: three faces qualify out of six, so a half. Ten cards numbered one to ten, face down: five are even, so a half again, the same number by a different route. A number above four on a die: five and six, two of six, so a third.
A bag with three purple, two blue and one green: three of the six are not purple, so a half. And the short word peace, five letters with the E doubled: a P, an E or a C is four fifths, and not an E is three fifths. Check that the outcomes are equally likely, then count. A spinning wheel divided into eight sectors, numbered one to eight, and one detail worth noticing first.
Nobody measured those sectors. You are told they are equal, and being told is a good reason, as long as you know that is what happened. A drawing is not evidence about a real wheel. Any one number is one eighth. An odd number: four of the eight qualify, so a half. A number greater than two: six of the eight, so three quarters. A number less than nine: all eight, so the answer is one, an event that cannot fail.
A multiple of three: three and six, so two eighths, a quarter. Sometimes the condition is easy and the counting is the work. Roll two dice and ask for a total that is prime and greater than five. Only seven and eleven qualify, but you cannot count totals: totals are groups, and they come in different sizes. Count the pairs instead: thirty-six, equally likely, and eight of them total seven or eleven.
Eight thirty-sixths, which is two ninths. Or take the digits one to four and arrange all four, no digit repeated. There are twenty-four such numbers, and twelve end in an even digit, so an even number is a half. In each case the formula did nothing. The counting did everything, and it had to be done on the right collection. Ask what the outcomes are, ask what makes them equally likely, and only then divide.
Where this fits
Taken from the notes each video was made from, not from the reading order — these are the ideas this one rests on and the ones that later rest on it.
Builds on
- The 0-to-1 scale, and what the endpoints meanClass 9 · Ch 7, The Mathematics of Maybe: Introduction to Probability
- Experimental probability: relative frequency over many trialsClass 9 · Ch 7, The Mathematics of Maybe: Introduction to Probability
- Why long division must either stop or loopClass 9 · Ch 3, The World of Numbers
Comes up again in
- Fair, unbiased, and memoryless: the gambler's fallacyClass 9 · Ch 7, The Mathematics of Maybe: Introduction to Probability
- Listing every outcome: the sample spaceClass 9 · Ch 7, The Mathematics of Maybe: Introduction to Probability
- An event is a selection from the sample spaceClass 9 · Ch 7, The Mathematics of Maybe: Introduction to Probability
- Tree diagrams make the sample space of a two-step experiment visibleClass 9 · Ch 7, The Mathematics of Maybe: Introduction to Probability
Either side of this one
- Estimating from statistical data, and scaling the estimate upClass 9 · Ch 7, The Mathematics of Maybe: Introduction to Probability