PrepShorts · Study sheet · Class 11 Mathematics · Chapter 14, Probability
Chapter 14 · Probability
Every description of a happening picks out a part of the outcome list
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'At least one tail' and 'at most one head', asked of two tossed coins, name different faces of the coin - and pick out the identical three outcomes.
The idea
The chapter defines an event to be any subset of the sample space, and that definition is forced rather than chosen: because exactly one outcome occurs, and because the sample space lists every outcome that could, each description of a happening is settled true or false the instant the outcome is known. A description therefore carries no information beyond the collection of outcomes that make it true — which is why the mathematics can throw the sentence away and keep the set. The chapter's own table proves the translation runs only one way cleanly: two of its six differently worded descriptions land on the identical subset.
What you should be able to do
- State the chapter's definition of an event, and say why the word "any" in it cannot be weakened
- Translate a description given in ordinary language into the subset of a stated sample space that corresponds to it
- Translate in the other direction: given a subset, produce a description that picks it out
- Show that two unlike descriptions can determine one event, using the pair the chapter prints
- Decide, given a realised outcome and an event, whether that event has occurred, and justify the decision by membership
- Identify the subsets that the extreme descriptions produce — the whole sample space and the empty set
- Explain why the size of an event is at most the size of the sample space, and what an event of size zero means
Words to know
| Term | Definition in one line | First introduced |
|---|---|---|
| event | any subset of the sample space, without further condition | printed in this chapter, the Definition line of §14.1, p. 289 |
| sample space | the set of everything the experiment could produce, one element per outcome | printed in this chapter, §14.1, p. 289, where it is used as already familiar and is never defined |
| random experiment | the procedure whose result is not settled in advance | printed in this chapter, §14.1, p. 289, named in the opening sentence and nowhere explained |
| outcome | one result of performing the experiment once | printed in this chapter, §14.1, p. 289 |
| sample point | a single element of the sample space, viewed as a member rather than a result | printed in this chapter, §14.1.2, p. 290 |
| subset | a set every member of which also belongs to a second set | printed in this chapter, §14.1, p. 289 |
| universal set | the set that every set under discussion sits inside | printed in this chapter, §14.1, p. 289, where the sample space is given this role |
| occurrence of an event | the event containing the outcome that actually turned up | printed in this chapter as the heading of §14.1.1, p. 290 |
| description of events | the wording in ordinary language that a subset translates | printed in this chapter as a column heading of the table on p. 289 |
| membership test | an added name for the one question that decides occurrence | an added term; the chapter performs the test and gives it no label |
Where people slip up
- "An event is one outcome." The chapter's own first event has two elements and its third has three. One outcome is a permitted size, not the meaning.
- "Different wording means different events." Two rows of the printed table differ in both of their content words and still pick out the same three outcomes — and a student with the table can see the four words they share, so do not narrate this as wording that disagrees throughout. Sameness of events is sameness of sets, and nothing else.
- "The empty set is not an event, it is the absence of one." The definition admits every subset, and the chapter supplies a description that produces the empty set on purpose. Excluding it would leave descriptions with no translation.
- "An event occurred because it was the likely one." Occurrence is decided by membership after the outcome is known. Not one probability is stated anywhere in §14.1 — verified against the page images of pp. 289–295, which carry the section and the whole of Exercise 14.1.
- "HT and TH are the same thing." They are two outcomes, distinguished by which toss produced the head. Merging them breaks the four-element list the rest of the chapter counts against.
- "An event has to be describable in a short sentence." The definition points the other way: every subset is an event whether or not anyone has a phrase for it. Description is how humans reach events, not what events are.
- "The sample space is the biggest event, so it is not really one." It is a subset of itself, so it qualifies, and the chapter's fifth row reaches it from an ordinary-sounding description.
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Worked answers: Exercise 14.1 · Exercise 14.2 · Miscellaneous Exercise · this video explains Exercise 14.1 Q2
Transcript2,222 words
Toss one coin twice, and write down what both tosses showed, in order. There are four things that can happen. Head then head. Head then tail. Tail then head. And tail then tail. Those two in the middle are not the same thing. Both of them show a single head, and they differ in which toss produced it, so they are two entries on the list and not one. Merge them and there are three entries instead of four, and every count in the rest of this video moves.
The list is the starting point, and it has one property that everything else rests on. Exactly one of those four is going to happen. Not two of them, and not none of them. Now here is a sentence. Exactly one head. That is a description of a happening, written in ordinary words, and the list has no idea what to do with it yet. So take the sentence to each outcome in turn and ask a single question: is this one of the outcomes that makes the sentence true?
Head then head has two heads, so no. Head then tail has one, so yes. Tail then head has one, so yes. Tail then tail has none, so no. Two of the four answered yes, and the sentence has finished its work. What it has left behind is a collection of outcomes. Head-tail, and tail-head. One sentence is not enough to see the pattern, so here are six, all asked of the same four outcomes.
The number of tails is exactly two. Only the last outcome has two tails, so that sentence picks out one outcome. The number of tails is at least one. That is true of head-tail, tail-head and tail-tail, and false only of the outcome with two heads. Three outcomes. The number of heads is at most one. Head-head is out, and the other three are in. Three outcomes again. Hold on to that, because we are going to come back to it.
The second toss is not a head. That one does not count anything at all; it reads a single position and asks what is sitting in it. Head-tail and tail-tail, so two outcomes. The number of tails is at most two. Two tosses cannot produce more than two tails, so every outcome qualifies, and that sentence picks out all four. The number of tails is more than two. No outcome qualifies, and that sentence picks out nothing whatever.
Six sentences. The sizes of what they picked out run one, three, three, two, four and nought. Look at the second and the third. At least one tail. At most one head. They are talking about different faces of the coin. One of them puts a floor under a count and the other puts a ceiling on a different count. And they picked out the identical three outcomes. Not three outcomes that happen to be the same number of outcomes.
The same three. Check it one outcome at a time and they agree four times out of four. The reason is easy to see once you look at what each of them throws away. Both of them exclude head-head, and neither of them excludes anything else. So the collection of outcomes that survives is the same collection, and two quite different sentences have arrived at one place. That is the moment where it is very easy to learn the wrong lesson.
It looks like a fact about English. At least one tail means at most one head, so those two phrases are interchangeable. They are not. Take the same two sentences and ask them of a coin tossed three times instead. At least one tail is now true of every outcome except the one with three heads, so it picks out seven of the eight. At most one head is true of only four of them.
Seven against four. The two sentences have come apart. Run them over one toss, two tosses, three, and on up to eight, and they agree on exactly one of those eight experiments. The one with two tosses. So the coincidence we just watched is not a property of the words. It is a property of this experiment, and the words did not know it was coming. The last two of the six sentences are worth stopping on, because they are the ones people want to throw out.
One of them picked out nothing at all. The other picked out everything there is. Both of those are collections of outcomes from the list, exactly like the other four, and there is no principled place to draw a line that keeps the middle four and refuses these two. And it is not a quirk of coins. Throw one die and ask for a number below seven: every face qualifies.
Ask for a number above seven: none of them does. Same two ends, different experiment. A description that nothing satisfies still names something, and what it names is the collection with nothing in it. So here is the definition the whole subject is built on. An event is any subset of the list of outcomes. Any. Not any subset that somebody has a phrase for. Not any subset that is easy to say.
Any subset at all, including the one with everything in it and the one with nothing in it. That word is doing real work, and the rest of this video is about how much. Because the natural thing to want instead is a definition built out of descriptions: an event is a happening you can describe, and the outcomes are just how you check it. That sounds harmless. It is not, and the way to see why is to count.
Four outcomes. How many collections of them are there? Take them one at a time. There is the empty collection. There are four collections holding a single outcome. Six holding a pair. Four holding three. And one holding all four. Add those up and you get sixteen. Sixteen events sitting on four outcomes, whether or not anybody ever writes a sentence about them. Our six sentences reached five of them, because two of the six landed together.
Five out of sixteen. Eleven of those events never appeared on the board at all, and nothing was wrong with the six sentences. There are simply more collections than there were sentences. Six sentences is a small sample, so let us be fairer to language than that. Build every sentence of one very ordinary shape. The number of some face is in some relation to some number. Two faces to choose from, heads or tails.
Five relations: exactly, at least, at most, more than, fewer than. And three numbers, nought, one or two, because two tosses cannot give you more than two of anything. Two times five times three is thirty sentences, and nobody chose which ones to include; they were generated. Thirty sentences, asked of four outcomes. How many different collections do they reach between them? Seven. Thirty sentences, seven events. They fall into seven groups, and the biggest group has six different sentences in it, all of them naming one collection.
Seven out of sixteen, so nine of the events are out of reach of that whole family. And one of the nine is not exotic at all. The two tosses agree. That is a perfectly ordinary thing to want to say, and it picks out two outcomes: head-head, and tail-tail. It is a collection of outcomes like any other. But not one of those thirty sentences can name it. The reason is worth saying slowly.
Every one of them reads only how many heads there are, and head-tail and tail-head have the same number of heads. A sentence that can only count is blind to the difference between them. Check that directly and not one of the thirty separates those two outcomes. Which also means neither head-tail on its own, nor tail-head on its own, is reachable by counting. So describability is not what makes an event.
The collection exists; the shape of sentence you brought is what ran out. Now go back to the property we started with. Exactly one outcome happens. That is what makes the whole translation work, because it means every description is settled the instant the outcome is known. There is no waiting, and no description can be left half true. And it works the other way too. Take any two different events on those four outcomes.
There is always an outcome that lies in one of them and not the other, and over every one of the hundred and twenty pairs there is, that holds a hundred and twenty times. No event is ever told apart from itself, and no two different events are ever left indistinguishable. So the collection carries everything that could ever be observed about the description, and the sentence carries nothing beyond the collection.
That is the licence to throw the sentence away. Which brings us to what it means for an event to occur. Throw one die, and let the event be a number below four. As a collection, that is one, two and three. Now throw. If a one comes up, the event occurred, because one is in the collection. A two: occurred. A three: occurred. A four: it did not. Five, no.
Six, no. Three of the six outcomes make it happen and three do not, and notice what did not change across those six sentences. The event. It was the same three numbers every single time. Occurrence is not a property of the event; it is a question asked of the event and one outcome together, and the whole of the question is whether that outcome is inside. Nothing about how likely it was has appeared anywhere in this video, and nothing needs to.
The translation drill is the same on any experiment, so run six descriptions past one die. A number below seven picks out all six faces. A number above seven picks out nothing. A multiple of three picks out three and six. A number below four picks out one, two and three. An even number above four picks out six alone. A number not below three picks out three, four, five and six.
Six, nought, two, three, one and four. Two of those six are the two ends again, and the middle four are ordinary sentences that happen to land on ordinary collections. Make the experiment bigger and the reason for keeping sets rather than sentences becomes hard to argue with. Roll a pair of dice, and record both, so there are thirty-six outcomes. The sum is above eight: ten outcomes. A two appears on one die or the other: eleven outcomes.
Careful with that one. Six outcomes have a two on the first die, six have a two on the second, and one of them has a two on both, so it is eleven and not twelve. The sum is at least seven and also a multiple of three: five outcomes, the ones adding to nine and the one adding to twelve. And now the sets do work that sentences cannot.
The first two cannot both happen, because the largest sum you can reach with a two on a die is eight. Nor can the second and the third. But every outcome of the third is already inside the first, because nine and twelve are both above eight. None of that was visible in the wording. It was visible the moment the wording was traded for a collection. One more count, and it is the one that settles the argument.
Toss three coins and there are eight outcomes. The number of events on eight outcomes is two hundred and fifty-six. Counted by size: one empty, eight holding a single outcome, twenty-eight holding a pair, fifty-six holding three, seventy holding four, and then the same numbers again on the way back down. They add to two hundred and fifty-six exactly. Three heads is one of the eight single-outcome events. A head on the first coin is not; that one holds four outcomes.
Now go back to the pair of dice, with its thirty-six outcomes. The number of events there is more than sixty-eight thousand million. Nobody was ever going to describe those one at a time. A definition that only admitted the describable ones would have had to say which sentences count, in what language, and how long they are allowed to be. So that is what the word any is buying.
A description is how a person reaches an event. It is not what the event is. Two unlike sentences can arrive at one collection, and we watched that happen and then watched it stop happening the moment the experiment changed. A whole family of thirty sentences can leave nine collections unreachable, including one as plain as the two tosses agreeing. And once the sentence is traded for the collection, the operations you already know on collections are waiting: what two events have in common, what falls in either, what is left over.
That is the next thing, and it only works because an event was defined as any subset and not as a sentence. The sentence gets you in. The set is what survives.
Where this fits
Taken from the notes each video was made from, not from the reading order — these are the ideas this one rests on and the ones that later rest on it.
Comes up again in
- The two extreme cases, and the difference between one outcome and manyClass 11 · Ch 14, Probability
- "Or", "and" and "not" are the three set operations under new namesClass 11 · Ch 14, Probability
Either side of this one
- Shifting and scaling the observations to make the arithmetic smallClass 11 · Ch 13, Statistics